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Two	corporate	governance	mechanisms:	activism	and
hostile	takeovers
Hostile	takeovers	have	long	been	considered	the	quintessential	disciplinary	governance	mechanism.	A	similarly
confrontational	strategy	has	lately	come	to	prominence	by	way	of	activist	hedge	funds	that	buy	into	poorly	run	firms
and	use	the	threat	of	hostile	tactics	to	pressure	management	into	accepting	specific	proposals	to	improve
shareholder	value.
Our	paper	compares	these	two	governance	mechanisms	within	a	unified	framework	where	any	outside	investor	—
bidder	or	activist	—	faces	a	dual	free-rider	problem	since	target	shareholders	neither	contribute	to	the	cost	of
intervention	nor	sell	their	shares	unless	the	price	fully	reflects	the	anticipated	value	improvement.
As	bidders	acquire	control,	dispersed	shareholders	free-ride	by	selling	their	shares	only	if	the	takeover
premium	incorporates	the	expected	post-takeover	gains.	Acquiring	those	shares	increases	bidders’	incentives	to
improve	share	value	afterwards,	but	paying	the	premium	prevents	them	from	recouping	the	costs	of	doing	so.	These
unrecompensed	costs	are	their	costs	of	gaining	control.
Activism	does	not	build	on	majority	control.	On	the	contrary,	the	point	of	the	campaign	is	to	compensate	for	the	lack
of	it.	The	activist	hence	optimally	limits	her	share	purchase,	balancing	the	benefit	of	gaining	influence	from	additional
voting	rights	against	the	cost	of	unrecompensed	effort.	The	downside	is	that	the	endogenous	limit	on	her	equity	stake
caps	her	effort	incentives,	and	when	the	value	she	creates	under	these	incentives	is	too	small,	activism	does	not
materialise.
Our	key	insight	is	that	the	profits	from	the	two	strategies	exhibit	opposite	comparative	statics	with	respect	to	the
potential	value	improvement.	In	particular,	a	larger	scope	for	value	improvement	in	the	target	firm	raises	the	takeover
premium	more	than	net	surplus,	but	at	the	same	time,	makes	an	activist	campaign	more	rewarding	relative	to	its
costs.	Thus,	activism	turns	more	profitable	as	takeovers	become	too	“expensive.”	This	entails	distinct	return	patterns.
Tender	offers	with	larger	surpluses	yield	smaller	bidder	returns,	while	more	valuable	campaigns	also	are	more
profitable.
In	the	second	part	of	the	paper,	we	analyse	how	activism	and	tender	offers	interact	with	the	board’s	prerogative	to
negotiate	mergers	that	are	binding	for	all	shareholders.	Ideally,	boards	overcome	free-riding,	but	coordination
problems	among	shareholders	reappear	when	boards	resist	control	changes	out	of	self-interest.	Yet,	the	prerogative
remains	relevant	insofar	as	outside	investors	can	seize	control	of	boards.
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Bidders	can	acquire	just	enough	shares	to	gain	control	and	absorb	the	remaining	shares	afterwards	through	a	so-
called	freeze-out	merger	(when	all	remaining	minority	shareholders	are	forced	to	sell	their	shares).	Activists	can
wage	campaigns	that	aim	at	brokering	mergers	with	bidders,	which	has	been	referred	to	as	takeover	activism.	Since
the	power	to	force	ownership	changes	can	be	abused,	there	is	legal	recourse:	mergers	are	contestable	in	court	and
can	be	amended,	if	deemed	to	be	in	breach	of	fiduciary	duty	or	unfair	to	dissenting	shareholders.
As	we	show,	the	legal	risk	of	a	subsequent	price	revision	amounts	to	stochastic	free-riding	and	has	opposite	effects
on	the	two	governance	mechanisms.	In	tender	offers,	the	option	to	freeze	out	minority	shareholders	harms	bidders
ex	ante.	To	minimise	unrecompensed	costs,	a	bidder	buys	just	enough	shares	to	reach	majority.	Absent	freeze-outs,
the	price	paid	equals	the	value	she	generates	owning	half	the	shares.	The	freeze-out	option	introduces	the
commitment	problem	that,	at	this	price,	the	bidder	will	exercise	a	freeze-out.	Anticipating	this,	and	in	view	of	the
possible	benefits	of	a	legal	challenge	to	the	freeze-out,	shareholders	then	hold	out	in	the	initial	offer.	In	equilibrium,
the	bidder	still	buys	as	few	shares	as	needed,	but	at	a	premium	at	which	a	subsequent	freeze-out	is	unattractive.
This	premium	decreases	with	legal	risk,	as	the	temptation	of	a	freeze-out	(i.e.,	commitment	problem)	weakens.
In	takeover	activism,	where	the	merger	allows	no	ex	ante	free-riding,	the	legal	risk	merely	reinforces	ex	post	free-
riding,	and	this	effect	is	aggravated	by	higher	legal	risk.	In	addition,	takeover	activists	limit	ex	ante	free-riding	during
the	campaign	stage,	but	by	using	the	merger	prerogative,	do	not	let	their	own	stakes	constrain	incentives	to	create
value—that	is,	they	also	limit	ex	post	free-riding,	if	not	during,	at	least	after	the	campaign.	Thus,	if	possible,	activists
are	better	off	acting	as	control	brokers,	rather	than	using	control	to	implement	value	improvements	on	their	own.
In	the	final	part	of	the	paper,	we	no	longer	examine	takeovers	and	activism	in	isolation	but
consider	(parameter)	constellations	in	which	both	are	simultaneously	feasible.	The	co-existence	as	feasible
alternatives	affects	tender	offers	and	activism	asymmetrically.	Optimal	tender	offers	are	pinned	down	by	the	majority
requirement	and	the	ex	ante	free-rider	condition,	whereas	the	bidder’s	outside	option	is	irrelevant	for	the	offer	terms.
By	contrast,	the	potential	of	a	tender	offer	erodes	activists’	already	limited	incentives	and	so	reduces	campaign
profitability.	In	the	case	of	a	single	“active”	outside	investor	who	can	make	a	bid	if	regular	activism	fails,	this	reduction
in	campaign	incentives	is	efficient,	since	the	takeover	is	socially	preferable.	This	is	not	true	in	the	presence	of	a
separate	bidder.	In	this	case,	the	activist	can	free-ride	on	a	bid,	so	activism	only	emerges	if	its	profitability	exceeds
the	expected	forgone	takeover	premium	(rather	than	bidder	profit).	We	show	that	regular	activism	cannot	clear	this
hurdle,	making	takeover	activism	the	only	relevant	alternative.	Furthermore,	revealed-preference	arguments	imply
that	takeover	activism	is	Pareto-improving.	Hence,	in	the	case	of	activist-bidder	pairs,	the	dis-incentivising	effect	of	a
potential	tender	offer	on	activism	is	welfare-decreasing.
Our	theoretical	analysis	has	implications	for	returns	across	different	types	of	activism	and	the	co-evolution	of	activism
and	M&A.	First,	takeover	activism	should	exhibit	higher	returns	than	other	forms	of	activism.	Second,	takeover
activism	generates	efficiency	gains	at	the	extensive	and	intensive	margin:	it	enables	takeovers	that	otherwise	would
not	occur	and	replaces	some	tender	offers	with	more	efficient	mergers.	Hence,	institutional	changes	that	facilitate
activism	should	not	cause	a	decrease	in	M&A.	Rather,	it	should	lead	to	a	concurrent	(1)	increase	in	campaigns,	(2)
increase	in	total	M&A	activity,	and	(3)	decline	in	hostile	bids.	This	broadly	matches	patterns	observed	since	the
1990s.
♣♣♣
Notes:
This	blog	post	appeared	originally	on	the	site	of	the	Harvard	Law	School	Forum	on	Corporate	Governance	and
Financial	Regulation,	and	has	been	slightly	edited	here.	It	is	based	on	the	authors’	paper	Activism	and
Takeovers,	CEPR	Discussion	Paper	No.	DP12616.
The	post	gives	the	views	of	its	authors,	not	the	position	of	LSE	Business	Review	or	the	London	School	of
Economics.
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